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I. Introduction 
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s 1971 article on abortion, “A Defense 
of Abortion,”1 is the most reprinted article on abortion ever 
written, and is one of the most reprinted philosophy articles of all 
time.2 Before Thomson’s article, the abortion debate was largely a 
debate about the personhood of the fetus.3 Was the fetus a person, 
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 1. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 
(1971), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 112 (Ronald Dworkin ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1977) [hereinafter A Defense of Abortion]. 
 2. William Parent, Preface to JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, RIGHTS, 
RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY, at vii (1986).  
 3. See A Defense of Abortion, supra note 1, at 112 (“Most opposition to 
abortion relies on the premise that the foetus is . . . a person, from the moment 
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endowed with the same moral rights as you or I, or was the fetus 
not a person? It was assumed that if the fetus was a person with 
the same moral rights as you or I, then abortion—which would 
then be the killing of an innocent person—was immoral. 
Thomson’s article changed the debate about abortion in at least 
two ways.4 First, it made the seemingly irresolvable debate about 
the personhood of the fetus irrelevant. Thomson simply assumed 
for the sake of the argument that the fetus was a person. Second, 
it rejected the assumption that killing an innocent person is 
(always) immoral. Thomson argued that, even if a fetus was a 
person from the moment of conception, endowed with the same 
moral rights as you or I (something that she did not believe), and 
even if abortion was the killing of an innocent person, abortion 
could still be morally permissible.5 The trump card against 
abortion—that it was the killing of an innocent person—was, she 
argued, not a trump card at all.6  
My aim in this Article is to defend Thomson’s argument from 
two important objections: the “Kill Versus Let Die Objection”7 
and the “Intend to Kill Versus Foresee Death Objection.”8 Both 
objections hold that even if her argument is sound, it fails to 
establish that abortion is permissible. I shall argue that both of 
these objections fail, and that, if her argument is sound, it 
establishes that abortion is permissible. Many people—although 
not everyone—believe that her argument is sound. It follows that 
they should agree that her argument establishes that abortion is 
permissible. 
                                                                                                     
of conception.”). 
 4. See N. ANN DAVIS, FACT AND VALUE: ESSAYS ON ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS 
FOR JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON 82 (MIT Press, 2001) (discussing how Thomson 
changed the abortion debate by assuming the personhood of the fetus and 
arguing that this did not decide the question of the morality of abortion). 
 5. See id. at 112 (claiming that “[o]pponents of abortion commonly spend 
most of their time establishing that the foetus is a person, and hardly any time 
explaining the step from there to the impermissibility of abortion”).  
 6. See id. (claiming it is “false” that “directly killing an innocent person is 
always and absolutely impermissible”). 
 7. Infra Part III. 
 8. Infra Part IV. 
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II. The Good Samaritan Argument 
Thomson’s argument, at least with respect to pregnancy as a 
result of rape, is as follows.9  
Imagine that you are pregnant as a result of rape, and 
assume that the fetus10 is an innocent person with the same 
moral rights as you or I. Even if the fetus is an innocent person, 
you have not given the fetus permission to use your body. 
Because you have not given the fetus permission to use your 
body, the fetus has no right to use your body.11 This is because no 
one has the right to use your body without your permission.12  
If someone lacks the right to use your body, then that person 
lacks the right to use your body even if that person needs to use 
your body in order to live. You may, therefore, refuse to allow 
another person to use your body, even if the other person will die 
as a result of this refusal. Because the fetus has no right to use 
your body, you may refuse to allow the fetus to use your body, 
even if the fetus will die as a result of this refusal.  
The way to refuse to allow a (pre-viable) fetus to use your 
body is to have an abortion. Because you may refuse to allow a 
fetus who lacks the right to use your body to use your body, even 
if the fetus will die as a result, it follows that having an abortion 
is permissible in the case of a pregnancy as a result of rape, at 
least before the fetus is viable.13 Hence, abortion is permissible in 
the case of a pregnancy as a result of rape, at least before the 
fetus is viable, even if the fetus is a person with the same moral 
rights as you or I.  
                                                                                                     
 9. In this Article I do not defend Thomson’s entire argument, and this is 
not a summary of her entire argument. In this Article I only defend the first 
part of her argument, which is an argument about pregnancy as a result of rape. 
This is only a summary of the first part of her argument. 
 10. For the purposes of the argument, it makes no difference whether we 
are talking about a zygote, a pre-embryo, an embryo, or a fetus.  
 11. See A Defense of Abortion, supra note 1, at 120 (“I suppose we may take 
it as a datum that in a case of pregnancy due to rape the mother has not given 
the unborn person a right to the use of her body for food and shelter.”).  
 12. See id. at 118 (“My own view is that if a human being has any just, 
prior claim to anything at all, he has a just, prior claim to his own body.”).  
 13. See id. at 127 (“I agree that the desire for the child’s death is not one 
which anybody may gratify, should it turn out to be possible to detach the child 
alive.”).  
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Of course, according to this argument, you may allow the 
fetus to use your body when you are pregnant as a result of rape. 
You are not prohibited from doing so. Simply because the fetus 
has no right to use your body, it does not follow that you may not 
grant the fetus permission to use your body. But because the 
fetus has no right to use your body, even if the fetus needs your 
body in order to live, if you do allow the fetus to use your body, 
then this is a supererogatory act on your part, and not the result 
of anything that is owed to the fetus.14 If you allow the fetus to 
use your body, then you are being a “Good Samaritan.”15 Hence 
the name for Thomson’s argument defending abortion is “the 
Good Samaritan Argument,”16 although it has also been called 
the “Argument from Bodily Autonomy,”17 or the “Feminist 
Argument.”18 
As Thomson pointed out at the time of her writing in 1971, 
most states prohibited abortion even in the case of rape.19 
Although being a Good Samaritan was not a requirement of any 
other U.S. law, being a Good Samaritan was a requirement of 
those laws that prohibited abortion even in the case of rape.20 
Hence, states criminalizing abortion, even in the case of rape, 
were guilty of imposing a Good Samaritan requirement on 
pregnant women that they did not impose on anyone else.21 This 
was a “gross injustice” against pregnant women: 
                                                                                                     
 14. See id. at 124 (“Nobody is morally required to make large sacrifices . . . 
in order to keep another person alive.”).  
 15. See id. (describing the “Good Samaritan” as one who goes out of his way 
to help others in need at some cost to himself).  
 16. DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF ABORTION 133 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2002). 
 17. JOEL FEINBERG, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH 209 (Temple Univ. Press, 
1980).  
 18. PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 132 (Cambridge Univ. Press 3d ed. 
2011). 
 19. See A Defense of Abortion, supra note 1, at 127 (describing laws 
prohibiting abortion in the case of a raped minor as “insane”). The Texas statute 
at issue in Roe v. Wade allowed for abortion in the case of rape and incest. See 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117–18 (1973) (referencing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 
art. 1191–94, 1196 (West 1973)).  
 20. See infra note 23 and accompanying text (stating that most states 
oblige women to be Good Samaritans and to carry “unborn persons” inside 
them).  
 21. See infra note 23 and accompanying text (arguing that the only people 
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My main concern here is not the state of the law in respect to 
abortion, but it is worth drawing attention to the fact that in 
none of the United States is any man compelled by law to be 
even a Minimally Decent Samaritan to any person; there is no 
law under which charges could be brought against the thirty-
eight who stood by while Kitty Genovese died.[22] By contrast, 
in most states in this country women are compelled by law to 
be not merely Minimally Decent Samaritans, but Good 
Samaritans to unborn persons inside them. This doesn’t by 
itself settle anything one way or the other, because it may well 
be argued that there should be laws in this country—as there 
are in many European countries—compelling at least 
Minimally Decent Samaritanism. But it does show that there 
is a gross injustice in the existing state of the law. And it 
shows also that the groups currently working against 
liberalization of abortion laws, in fact working toward having 
it declared unconstitutional for a state to permit abortion, had 
better start working for the adoption of Good Samaritan laws 
generally, or earn the charge that they are acting in bad 
faith.23 
There are many objections to Thomson’s argument.24 All of 
them, I believe, fail. My concern here is with two objections that 
hold that even if her argument is sound, it fails to establish that 
abortion is permissible. These objections accept, for the sake of 
the argument, that a woman who is pregnant as a result of rape 
may refuse to allow the fetus to use her body, even if the fetus 
will die as a result of this refusal. They reject that this conclusion 
establishes that the pregnant woman may have an abortion.  
III. The Kill Versus Let Die Objection 
John Finnis, an early critic of the Good Samaritan 
Argument, argued that Thomson’s argument “does in the end rely 
                                                                                                     
in the U.S. legally required to be Good Samaritans are women).  
 22. As it happens, the tale of thirty-eight people just watching Kitty 
Genovese being murdered, and not helping her, is apocryphal. See, e.g., STEVEN 
D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, SUPERFREAKONOMICS 139–89 (HarperCollins, 
2009) (discussing the altruistic impulse of human beings). Nevertheless, 
Thomson argues that none would have been breaking any law if they did so.  
 23. A Defense of Abortion, supra note 1, at 125. 
 24. See, e.g., JOHN T. WILCOX, THE ETHICS OF ABORTION: PRO-LIFE V. PRO-
CHOICE 212–25 (Prometheus Books, 1993). 
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on some version of the distinction, forced underground in her 
paper, between ‘direct killing’ and ‘not keeping another person 
alive.’”25 This objection may be put as follows. Killing (“direct 
killing”) is a different act from letting die (“not keeping another 
person alive”). More importantly, killing is morally worse than 
letting die.26 The moral bar for killing is higher than the moral 
bar for letting die.27 Even if you may let someone die, it does not 
follow that you may kill that person. Indeed, the moral bar for 
killing could be so high that you may never kill a person—or at 
least, an innocent person (as opposed to a guilty person, or a 
person who is a threat (to one’s life or well-being), or a person 
who is an innocent threat, or a person who is innocently shielding 
a threat).28 However, even if this claim is false, and even if there 
are circumstances in which you may kill an innocent person, 
killing is morally worse than letting die. Even if you may let 
someone die, it does not follow from this that you may kill that 
person. Any argument, therefore, that establishes that you may 
let someone die, does not establish thereby that you may kill that 
person.  
Even if the Good Samaritan Argument establishes that I may 
refuse to allow the fetus to use my body, with the result that the 
fetus dies, it does not establish that I may kill the fetus. The most 
that the argument can establish is that, in the case of pregnancy 
as a result of rape, the pregnant woman is under no moral 
obligation to allow the fetus to use her body, even though the 
fetus will die as a result of this refusal. She may let the fetus die. 
However, she remains under the moral obligation not to kill the 
fetus. But abortion is the killing of a fetus, not the act of letting a 
                                                                                                     
 25. John Finnis, The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
117, 124 (1973), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 129, 135 (Ronald Dworkin 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1977).  
 26. See id. at 147 (distinguishing between “a denial of aid and succor to 
someone” and “an actual intervention that amounts to an assault on the body of 
that person”).  
 27. See id. at 142 (stating that a duty to refrain from doing injury to an 
innocent person is stricter than the duty to aid others) (citing Philippa Foot, The 
Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV. 5 
(1967)).  
 28. For more on innocent threats and innocent shields to threats, see 
SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 83–182 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1989).  
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fetus die. Hence, the Good Samaritan Argument is irrelevant to 
the abortion debate.29 Abortion is immoral. 
Before continuing, it should be noted here that the exact 
opposite claim about the moral distinction between killing and 
letting die has been made. It has been argued that letting die is 
(or can be) morally worse than killing, because killing is (or can 
be) instant and painless, whereas letting die can be drawn out 
and painful: 
To begin with a familiar type of situation, a patient who is 
dying of incurable cancer of the throat is in terrible pain, 
which can no longer be satisfactorily alleviated. He is certain 
to die within a few days, even if present treatment is 
continued, but he does not want to go on living for those days 
since the pain is unbearable. So he asks the doctor for an end 
to it, and his family joins in the request.  
Suppose the doctor agrees to withhold treatment, as the 
conventional doctrine says he may. The justification for his 
doing so is that the patient is in terrible agony, and since he is 
going to die anyway, it would he wrong to prolong his suffering 
needlessly. But now notice this. If one simply withholds 
treatment, it may take the patient longer to die, and so he may 
suffer more than he would if more direct action were taken 
and a lethal injection given. This fact provides strong reason 
for thinking that, once the initial decision not to prolong his 
agony has been made, active euthanasia is actually preferable 
to passive euthanasia, rather than the reverse. To say 
otherwise is to endorse the option that leads to more suffering 
rather than less, and is contrary to the humanitarian impulse 
that prompts the decision not to prolong his life in the first 
place.  
Part of my point is that the process of being “allowed to 
die” can be relatively slow and painful, whereas being given a 
lethal injection is relatively quick and painless.30 
If it is accepted that killing is morally better than letting die, 
and hence that the moral bar for killing is lower than the moral 
bar for letting die, then the Good Samaritan Argument is 
                                                                                                     
 29. See Finnis, supra note 25, at 148 (“[W]ithin the traditional casuistry, 
the violinist-unplugging in Thomson’s version is not the ‘direct killing’ which she 
claims it is, and which she must claim it is if she is to make out her case for 
rejecting the traditional principle about direct killing.”). 
 30. James Rachels, Passive and Active Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
78, 78 (1975).  
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immune to the objection that the most that it can establish is that 
in the case of pregnancy as a result of rape, the woman may let 
the fetus die. This is true because, if the argument establishes 
that the woman may let the fetus die, and if this is morally worse 
than killing the fetus, then the argument establishes that the 
woman may kill the fetus. Whenever an argument establishes 
that a morally worse act may be performed, it necessarily 
establishes that a morally better act may be performed. Because 
abortion is the killing of a fetus, rather than the act of letting a 
fetus die,31 if the Good Samaritan Argument establishes that the 
woman may let the fetus die, it follows that the argument 
establishes that the woman may have an abortion. Abortion is 
permissible. 
However, in response to the claim that letting die is (or can 
be) morally worse than killing—because killing is (or can be) 
instant and painless, whereas letting die can be drawn out and 
can be painful—it has been argued that what makes letting die 
morally worse than killing is not the act of letting someone die, 
but the extra suffering involved in letting someone die.32 If letting 
die were instant and painless, like killing, it would be false that 
letting die is morally worse than killing. Hence, it has been 
argued that, all things being equal, it is false that letting die is 
morally worse than killing.33  
The claim that letting die is morally worse than killing will 
not be defended here in order to save the Good Samaritan 
Argument from Finnis’s objection. In any case, this argument is 
rejected by Thomson.34  
The claim that, all things being equal, killing is morally 
worse than letting die, is, however, accepted by many. Hence, the 
Good Samaritan Argument will be defended from Finnis’s 
objection—that abortion remains immoral even if the Good 
Samaritan Argument is sound, because abortion involves killing, 
and killing is worse than letting die, and the Good Samaritan 
                                                                                                     
 31. Supra text accompanying note 29. 
 32. See Rachels, supra note 30, at 78 (suggesting that active euthanasia, 
for example, a lethal injection, is more humane than the process of simply being 
“allowed to die,” which can involve far more time and suffering). 
 33. See id. at 79 (suggesting that many people incorrectly believe there is a 
moral difference between active and passive euthanasia).  
 34. Infra note 39 and accompanying text.  
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Argument can at best establish that in the case of pregnancy as a 
result of rape, the woman may let the fetus die. 
Consider the following two cases. In the first case, a woman’s 
ovum is harvested without her knowledge or consent. The ovum 
is placed in a petri dish. Sperm are added, and fertilization 
occurs, creating a zygote that develops into a pre-embryo. The 
woman is then informed that she must allow the pre-embryo to 
use her body (at least until viability), otherwise the pre-embryo 
will die (she is the only candidate for implantation).  
In the second case, the pre-embryo is created in the exact 
same way. However, the pre-embryo is now implanted in the 
woman’s uterus, without her knowledge or consent. The woman is 
then told that she must allow the pre-embryo to use her body (at 
least until viability), because the only alternative is to kill the 
pre-embryo.  
According to Finnis’s objection, the most that the Good 
Samaritan Argument can establish is that the woman in the first 
case is under no moral obligation to allow the pre-embryo to use 
her body, even if the pre-embryo will die as a result of this 
refusal.35 She may refuse to allow the pre-embryo to use her body, 
even if the pre-embryo will die as a result. She may let the pre-
embryo die, rather than allow the pre-embryo to use her body. 
However, Thomson’s argument cannot establish that the woman 
in the second case is not under a moral obligation not to kill the 
pre-embryo. She may not kill the pre-embryo, if that is the only 
way to prevent the pre-embryo from using her body.36 Because 
the only alternative to killing the pre-embryo is to allow the pre-
embryo to use her body, it is true that she must allow the pre-
embryo to use her body. The second case, however, is the abortion 
case, and not the first case. Hence, it follows that, even if the 
Good Samaritan Argument is sound, it is irrelevant to the 
abortion debate. Abortion is immoral. 
In her response to this objection, which may be called the 
“Kill Versus Let Die Objection,” Thomson argued that the 
objection can only be successful if it is already established that 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Finnis, supra note 25, at 147–48 (suggesting that Thomson’s Good 
Samaritan argument simply represents a choice not to provide assistance or 
facilities, and not a choice to kill). 
 36. See id. at 125 (claiming that the traditional rule is “‘[d]o not kill the 
innocent and just’”).  
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there is a profound moral difference between refusing to allow a 
person to use one’s body, such that the person dies (that is, 
letting a person die), and killing a person.37 She is skeptical, 
however, of there being any moral difference between letting a 
person die and killing a person.38 In any case, she rejects the idea 
that there is a profound moral difference between the two: 
So the decisive reason why I am wrong in making the 
assimilation is this: a reluctant Samaritan merely does not 
save a life, whereas the mother actually kills the child.  
Now it had not actually escaped my notice that the mother 
who aborts herself kills the child, whereas a man who refuses 
to be a Good Samaritan—on the traditional understanding of 
Good Samaritanism—merely does not save. My suggestion 
was that from a moral point of view these cases should be 
assimilated. . . . To say “Ah, but if she refuses, she kills, 
whereas a man who refuses to set forth to give aid merely 
refrains from saving” is not only not decisive against my 
assimilation, it is no reason at all to think it improper—in the 
absence of a showing that (a) the difference between killing 
and not saving makes a moral difference, and indeed (b) the 
difference between killing and not saving makes a sufficiently 
profound moral difference as to make the assimilation 
improper. . . . It seems to me to be an interesting, and open, 
question whether or not (a) [it] is true . . . . However (b) [it] 
strikes me as false. . . .39 
Thomson’s response to this objection is defensible. Compare, 
for example, the following three cases: (i) a hysterotomy abortion, 
in which the fetus dies when removed from the uterus; (ii) a 
hysterectomy abortion, in which the fetus dies when the uterus 
containing the fetus is removed from woman’s body; and (iii) a 
craniotomy abortion, in which “the child’s skull is crushed to 
make it possible to get it out of the mother,”40 that is, the fetus is 
killed, in order for the fetus to be removed from the uterus. 
Thomson may be arguing that although the first two abortion 
cases are cases of letting the fetus die, and do not involve killing 
                                                                                                     
 37. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Rights and Deaths, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 146, 
157 (1972); Infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 38. Infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 39. Thomson, supra note 37, at 156–57.  
 40. Id. at 151. 
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the fetus,41 and the final abortion case is a case of killing the 
fetus, nevertheless, there is no moral difference between these 
three cases, or there is no profound moral difference between 
these three cases. Either the abortions in all three cases are 
equally immoral, or the abortions in all three cases are 
immoral—albeit unequally so, since one abortion is somewhat 
morally worse than the other two—or the abortions in all three 
cases are equally permissible, albeit unequally so, since one 
abortion is somewhat morally worse than the other two. That is 
to say, either the three abortions are morally equivalent, or they 
are sufficiently morally equivalent. However, the Good Samaritan 
Argument, if sound, establishes that the hysterotomy abortion 
and the hysterectomy abortion are permissible. It follows that the 
Good Samaritan Argument establishes that the craniotomy 
abortion is permissible, either because a craniotomy abortion is 
morally equivalent to the other two forms of abortion, or because 
a craniotomy abortion, even if somewhat morally worse than the 
other two forms of abortion, is sufficiently morally equivalent to 
the other two forms of abortion. This is because whenever an 
argument establishes that an act is permissible, it necessarily 
establishes that a morally equivalent act is permissible, and 
because whenever an argument establishes that an act is 
permissible, it can establish that a sufficiently morally equivalent 
act is permissible. 
This response by Thomson may be called the “Moral 
Equivalence Response” (or, if it is preferred, the “Near Moral 
Equivalence Response”) to the Kill Versus Let Die Objection. 
Although this response is a defensible response, it is possible to 
argue that this response fails. It can be argued, against Thomson, 
that there is a moral difference between killing and letting die, 
and even that this moral difference is a profound moral 
difference. Indeed, Thomson herself may now believe this.42  
Even if this response fails, however, it does not matter, 
because an alternative response to the Kill vs. Let Die Objection 
                                                                                                     
 41. See BOONIN, supra note 16, at 193 (stating that hysterotomy and 
hysterectomy abortions are usually considered a case of letting die rather than 
killing).  
 42. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Turning the Trolley, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
359, 372 (2008) (admitting “I find myself strongly inclined to think” that there is 
a “difference in weight between positive and negative duties”). 
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is available.43 This response is not made by Thomson, despite 
being inspired by her. The alternative response I have in mind is 
as follows. Let it be granted, for the sake of the argument, that 
there is a profound moral difference between letting a person die 
and killing a person. Nevertheless, the Good Samaritan 
Argument, if sound, does establish that a pregnant woman may 
kill a fetus.  
There are two arguments that can be made in favor of this 
response. The first argument, which I shall call the “Exclusive 
Argument,” is as follows. Let it be granted that the Good 
Samaritan Argument establishes that in the case of pregnancy as 
a result of rape, the pregnant woman may refuse to allow the 
fetus to use her body. If, however, the only way for the pregnant 
woman to exercise this refusal, that is, the only way for the 
pregnant woman to prevent the fetus from using her body, is to 
kill the fetus—if the only options are to allow the fetus to use her 
body or to kill the fetus—then she may kill the fetus. Hence, the 
Good Samaritan Argument does establish that a pregnant woman 
may kill a fetus. 
The more general argument that lies behind the Exclusive 
Argument is that, because no one has the right to use your body 
without your permission,44 if the only way to prevent a person 
from using your body is to kill that person, then you may kill that 
person. Even if it were true that if you have the options of 
preventing a person from using your body by letting that person 
die, or by killing that person, then you must let that person die, it 
would still be true that, if you only have the option of preventing 
a person from using your body by killing that person, then you 
may kill that person.  
In making the Good Samaritan Argument, Thomson uses the 
following analogy. One morning you wake up in bed and find 
yourself kidnapped and hooked up to an unconscious famous 
violinist who is dying from a rare kidney disease and who needs 
to use your kidneys for the next nine months in order to repair 
                                                                                                     
 43. See BOONIN, supra note 16, at 199–204 (making the different argument 
that the two ‘letting die’ forms of abortions involve greater risk to the pregnant 
woman, and therefore that the “killing form of abortion, which involves less risk 
to the pregnant woman, is permissible”).  
 44. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing the right to 
control the use of one’s body).  
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his own kidneys and live.45 The kidnapping of the violinist and 
the hooking up of the violinist to you was entirely the work of the 
“Society of Music Lovers,” who wish to save the famous violinist’s 
life.46 Her claim is that you may disconnect yourself from the 
violinist, even though he will die as a result, because he has no 
right to use your body without your permission.47 The Kill Versus 
Let Die Objection is that, even if you may disconnect yourself 
from the violinist with the result that he will die, you may not, for 
example, “slit his throat” and kill him.48 However, abortion is 
equivalent to slitting the violinist’s throat, because it involves 
killing the fetus. With respect to the Kill Versus Let Die 
Objection, the Good Samaritan Argument, even if sound, is 
irrelevant to the abortion debate. Abortion is immoral.  
The Exclusive Argument in defense of the Good Samaritan 
Argument against the Kill Versus Let Die Objection is that if 
disconnecting yourself from the violinist is not an option, and if 
the only options are to remain hooked up to the violinist for nine 
months or to slit his throat and kill him, then you may slit his 
throat and kill him.49 Even if the unconscious violinist has been 
kidnapped and does not intend to use your body for nine months, 
he has no right to use your body for nine months without your 
permission, and if the only way to prevent him from doing this is 
to kill him, then you may kill him. 
The Exclusive Argument is sufficient to defend the Good 
Samaritan Argument from the Kill Versus Let Die Objection. 
Nevertheless, if the Exclusive Argument is the only way to defend 
the Good Samaritan Argument from this objection, then the Good 
Samaritan Argument remains open to a modified version of the 
Kill Versus Let Die Objection—a version not anticipated by those 
who advanced the original objection. 
Quite simply, the original Kill Versus Let Die Objection 
makes the mistake of assuming that abortion always involves the 
                                                                                                     
 45. See A Defense of Abortion, supra note 1, at 113 (discussing the hypothetical). 
 46. Id.  
 47. See id. at 113–14 (noting that we as human beings have a right to 
control what happens to our bodies, and therefore it would be “outrageous” to be 
told that you must remain forcibly plugged to the violinist).  
 48. Id. at 127.  
 49. See id. at 119 (noting that if the donor remained plugged into the 
violinist, it would merely amount to kindness, not a duty). 
1442 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (2014) 
killing of the fetus.50 This is false. It is true that the most 
common, and safest, forms of abortion involve the killing of the 
fetus.51 Nevertheless, there are forms of abortion that do not 
involve the killing of the fetus, although they do lead to the death 
of the fetus, such as a hysterotomy abortion or a hysterectomy 
abortion.52 These forms of abortion are rarer because they are 
more dangerous.53 These forms of abortion are nevertheless 
available. If the Exclusive Argument is the only way to defend 
the Good Samaritan Argument, then this argument cannot 
establish that a woman may kill the fetus. The most that the 
Good Samaritan Argument can establish is that in the case of 
pregnancy as a result of rape, the pregnant woman may prevent 
the fetus from using her body by a form of abortion that does not 
involve killing the fetus, such as a hysterotomy abortion or a 
hysterectomy abortion. Because the vast majority of abortions are 
forms of abortion that involve killing the fetus,54 it follows that 
Thomson’s argument is irrelevant to the abortion debate, at least 
when one is talking about the more common, and safer, forms of 
abortion—which involve killing the fetus—and not the rarer, and 
more dangerous, forms of abortion—which do not involve killing 
the fetus, although they do involve letting the fetus die. The vast 
majority of abortions are immoral. 
This objection may be called the “Modified Kill Versus Let 
Die Objection.” It is probably not a problem for the Good 
Samaritan Argument. First, strictly speaking, the Good 
Samaritan Argument is an argument for why a woman who is 
pregnant as a result of rape may terminate her pregnancy. It is 
not necessarily an argument for why she may “terminate” the 
fetus.55 If the argument defends only certain forms of abortion, 
                                                                                                     
 50. See BOONIN, supra note 16, at 193–94 (describing certain methods of 
abortion characterized as “letting die” rather than “killing”).  
 51. See id. at 193 n.43 (noting that the mortality rate for women who have 
an abortion by way of hysterotomy is far greater than those who use the saline 
solution, which would be characterized as killing). 
 52. See id. (describing the hysterotomy procedure as removing the living 
fetus through an abdominal incision of the uterus and subsequently allowing 
the fetus to die).  
 53. See id. (noting that a hysterotomy is more invasive than other 
procedures and therefore reserved for later stages of pregnancy).  
 54. Supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (implying that the right to 
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namely those forms of abortion that lead to the death of the fetus 
and that do not involve killing the fetus, such as a hysterotomy 
abortion or a hysterectomy abortion, then it is still an argument 
that defends the permissibility of certain abortions. Second, the 
Exclusive Argument can be adapted. There are a number of other 
morally relevant factors to be taken into account when 
considering different forms of abortion, such as the threat to the 
pregnant woman’s life, or health, as well as the risk, or the 
certainty, of her being unable to become pregnant again.56 These 
morally relevant factors can be invoked to defend the choice of a 
safer form of abortion that involves killing the fetus over a more 
dangerous form of abortion that leads to the death of the fetus, 
and the choice of a form of abortion that does not jeopardize, or 
prevent, the woman from becoming pregnant again over a form of 
abortion that does. It can be argued that the only safe way, or the 
safest way, or the best way (with respect to future pregnancies) 
for a woman to prevent the fetus from using her body in the case 
of pregnancy as a result of rape is to have an abortion that 
involves killing the fetus. The Good Samaritan Argument would 
therefore remain relevant to the abortion debate, and the most 
common, and safer, forms of abortion would be permissible. 
As it happens, it is not necessary to adapt the Exclusive 
Argument in order to defend the Good Samaritan Argument from 
Modified Kill Versus Let Die Objection. This is because an 
alternative argument can be made in favor of the Good 
Samaritan Argument. This second argument I shall call the 
“Inclusive Argument,” and it is as follows. Let it be granted that 
the Good Samaritan Argument establishes that in the case of 
pregnancy as a result of rape, the pregnant woman may refuse to 
                                                                                                     
end one’s pregnancy does not amount to a right to secure or guarantee the death 
of that child). To “terminate” something is to bring something that lasts over 
some period of time “to an end.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
1289 (11th ed. 2006). To terminate a pregnancy is to bring a pregnancy to an 
end, or to end a pregnancy. Properly speaking, therefore, one may terminate a 
pregnancy and not “terminate” a fetus. Indeed, it is better to avoid applying the 
term “terminate” to fetuses at all, and to restrict the term to pregnancies. My 
thanks to Melina Bell for clarifying this point about the use of the term 
“terminate.”  
 56. See BOONIN, supra note 16, at 193 (noting, for example, that an 
abortion by way of a hysterectomy prevents a woman from giving birth in the 
future). 
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allow the fetus to use her body. If one way for the pregnant 
woman to exercise this refusal—that is, to prevent the fetus from 
using her body—is to kill the fetus, and if all other ways for the 
pregnant woman to exercise this refusal do not involve killing the 
fetus, but do involve the death of the fetus, then the pregnant 
woman may kill the fetus, nevertheless. If, for example, a woman 
who is pregnant as a result of rape and who wishes to prevent the 
fetus from using her body has the options of having a 
hysterotomy abortion, or a hysterectomy abortion, or a 
craniotomy abortion, then she may have a craniotomy abortion. It 
follows that the Good Samaritan Argument establishes that the 
craniotomy abortion is permissible and may be performed. 
The more general argument that lies behind the Inclusive 
Argument is that, because no one has the right to use your body 
without your permission, if you only have the options of 
preventing a person from using your body by letting that person 
die, or by killing that person, then you may kill that person. This 
is because, in the case of certain circumstances that are 
sufficiently morally serious, both a morally worse act and a 
morally better act are morally permissible.57 Even if one act 
remains morally worse, and the other act remains morally better, 
it is not the case that in such morally serious circumstances you 
may not perform the morally worse act.58 You may. 
According to the Inclusive Argument, if killing the violinist 
by slitting his throat is one option, and disconnecting yourself 
from the violinist such that he dies is another option, and these 
are the only two options for freeing yourself from the violinist, 
then you may slit the violinist’s throat, rather than disconnect 
yourself from him such that he dies. Even if the unconscious 
violinist has been kidnapped and does not intend to use your body 
for nine months, he has no right to use your body for nine months 
without your permission, and if one of the only two ways—both of 
which are lethal—to prevent him from doing so is to kill him, 
then you may kill him. 
                                                                                                     
 57. See Thomson, supra note 37, at 153–55 (providing an analogy, involving 
the bombing of children, in which indirect killing (morally better) and direct 
killing (morally worse) would both be permissible).  
 58. See BOONIN, supra note 16, at 221–26 (stating the contrary argument 
that it must be the case that performing the morally worse act involves less risk 
to the killer).  
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The Inclusive Argument does not require the rejection of the 
idea that there is a profound moral difference between letting a 
person die and killing a person. It simply requires the acceptance 
of the idea that both killing and letting die are options in the 
situation in which another person is using your body without 
your permission, and there is no way to prevent this person from 
using your body without your permission, other than these two 
ways. They are both options because the situation in which 
another person is using your body without your permission is 
sufficiently morally serious.  
Consider the following case. You are a police marksman with 
a clear shot at the head of a schoolboy who is unknowingly 
carrying a bomb—placed in his school lunchbox by a group of 
terrorists—into a crowded school. The bomb is set to detonate as 
soon as the child enters the school building. You have been given 
the okay to take the shot. The child, however, is about to trip on a 
high voltage electric wire that will kill him. Your options—
granted that you may prevent him from killing the other innocent 
schoolchildren and teachers,59 and that these are the only two 
ways of preventing him from doing so—are to shoot him in the 
head and kill him, or to refrain from shooting him, and let him 
die from tripping on the wire. According to the Inclusive 
argument, you may kill the schoolboy, rather than let him to die 
from tripping on the wire. 
The fact that you may kill the schoolboy does not entail that 
there is not a profound moral difference between killing and 
letting die. It simply entails that in a situation in which an 
innocent person is about to kill hundreds of innocent people, you 
may either kill the person or let the person die, when there are no 
other ways to stop him. It may still be true that if an innocent 
teacher comes between you and the schoolboy, such that your 
shot is blocked, and if the schoolboy is bumped out of the way by 
this teacher, such that the schoolboy does not trip on the wire, 
you may still not kill the teacher with a shot in order to get a 
clear shot at the schoolboy, but you may let the teacher trip on 
the wire and die, because of the profound moral difference 
                                                                                                     
 59. I take it that you are morally obligated (if not also professionally 
obligated) to prevent the schoolboy from killing all of those other innocent 
people—at least if you can do so without killing any other innocent people. It 
would be immoral not to stop him if you (morally permissibly) could. 
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between killing and letting die. This is because the teacher 
himself is not an innocent threat. 
It may be objected here that this case fails to be analogous to 
the case of a woman being pregnant as a result of rape, because 
there the fetus is not, or at least is not necessarily, a threat to her 
life or to her health. Hence, the fetus is not an innocent threat, to 
be either killed or let die. To this objection it may be countered 
that the fetus is nevertheless a burden, and is using the pregnant 
woman’s body without her permission, albeit unintentionally. 
Thus the fetus is an innocent burden.  
Nor does it matter that the fetus is not violating the right of 
the woman to her bodily autonomy, because a fetus cannot violate 
the rights of another, given that the fetus is not conscious, is not 
in control of his or her behavior, etc.60 The schoolboy in the bomb 
example is not violating the rights of the other schoolchildren and 
teachers either, since he is completely unconscious of the bomb in 
his lunchbox. It is possible to be an innocent threat, or to be an 
innocent burden, without violating the rights of anyone.  
Another author writing on Thomson has referred to the fetus 
in the case of pregnancy as a result of rape as an “innocent 
aggressor”: 
It might be thought that . . . [t]he violinist . . . being an 
innocent pawn in the hands of the well-meaning Society of 
Music Lovers, may not be resisted because he has not 
intentionally encroached on anyone’s rights. I think this is 
mistaken. . . . [S]elf-defense is available and may also be 
used.61 
While it is true that someone who is using my body without 
my permission may be refused the use of my body—may be 
“resisted”—with the result that he dies even if his use of my body 
is unintentional and he is, therefore, not violating, or encroaching 
upon, my rights, it is not necessary to characterize this use of my 
body as an act of aggression or to invoke my right of self-defense. 
It is sufficient to characterize this use of my body as burdensome 
                                                                                                     
 60. I would like to thank Melina Bell for this objection to an earlier version 
of this argument, and to thank David Boonin for discussion of this objection. 
 61. DAVID S. ODERBERG, APPLIED ETHICS: A NON-CONSEQUENTIALIST 
APPROACH 25 (Blackwell, 2000). Note that Oderberg does not believe that the 
“aggression” of the violinist, and hence of the fetus, is serious enough to warrant 
a lethal response. 
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and to point out that the other person lacks a right to burden me. 
Since he lacks a right to burden me, I do not violate his rights 
when I prevent him from burdening me.62 As it has been said: 
There are cases in which it is morally defensible to kill a 
person . . . . These include not only self-defense . . . but also 
cases . . . of justifiable termination of life-support in which one 
person chooses not to continue to bear the burden of providing 
life-support to another person, even though this choice has 
foreseeably fatal consequences for the person whose life-
support is thus terminated.63 
In the case of a woman who is pregnant as a result of rape 
and who detects the pregnancy before the fetus is viable, even if 
other forms of abortion that do not involve killing the fetus, but 
that lead to the death of the fetus, are available, the woman may 
still have an abortion that involves killing the fetus in order to 
prevent the fetus from using her body. Both are options because 
the situation in which the fetus is using your body without your 
permission is sufficiently morally serious. 
The Inclusive Argument is able to defend the Good 
Samaritan Argument from both the Kill Versus Let Die Objection 
and the Modified Kill Versus Let Die Objection. It follows that if 
the Good Samaritan Argument is sound, it establishes what it 
needs to establish in order to prove that abortion of any form is 
permissible, at least when the woman is pregnant as a result of 
rape, and the fetus is not viable. 
It should be noted that there is another argument that may 
be used to defend the Good Samaritan Argument from the Kill 
Versus Let Die Objection and the Modified Kill Versus Let Die 
Objection. This is the argument that a woman who is pregnant as 
a result of rape may kill the fetus even if there are other ways of 
preventing the fetus from using her body that do not result in the 
death of the fetus. That is, if, in addition to abortions that involve 
killing the fetus and abortions that involve the fetus dying 
without killing the fetus, there is a non-abortion option that 
                                                                                                     
 62. I would like to thank David Boonin for clarifying in private 
correspondence that the argument concerns a lack of a right on the part of the 
fetus, as opposed to a violation of a right on the part of the fetus.  
 63. Nancy Davis, Abortion and Self-Defense, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175, 179 
(1984).  
1448 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (2014) 
involves the fetus continuing to live without using the pregnant 
woman’s body, then the pregnant woman may still kill the fetus.64 
This third argument I shall call the “Permissive Argument.” 
Thomson rejects this argument because the Good Samaritan 
Argument is, strictly speaking, an argument in defense of 
terminating a pregnancy—which normally involves having an 
abortion—rather than a defense of killing a fetus.65 As it has been 
said, Thomson’s view of abortion is “essentially a form of 
pregnancy termination . . . rather than . . . termination of the life 
of the fetus,”66 at least if that pregnancy determination could be 
effected without the death of the fetus. In the case of a pre-viable 
fetus, the termination of a pregnancy is an abortion, since the 
fetus is not viable. Thus, in the case of a pre-viable fetus, to 
defend the termination of a pregnancy is to defend an abortion. 
The Good Samaritan Argument, therefore, defends abortion in 
the case of a pre-viable fetus. Given that the vast majority of 
pregnancy terminations involve pre-viable fetuses,67 the vast 
majority of terminations of pregnancies are abortions. As a result, 
the Good Samaritan Argument defends the vast majority of 
abortions. However, in the case of a viable fetus, the termination 
of a pregnancy is not necessarily an abortion.68 Consequently, in 
the case of a viable fetus, the termination of pregnancy may be a 
procedure that has the result that the fetus continues to live 
outside the uterus.69 Hence, in the case of a viable fetus, to defend 
the termination of a pregnancy is not necessarily to defend an 
abortion. Thomson argues—at least if the fetus is not threatening 
the life, or the health, of the pregnant woman—that even if the 
                                                                                                     
 64. See BOONIN, supra note 16, at 255 (suggesting that technology may 
enable future doctors to employ non-abortion procedures that will sustain a 
viable fetus’s life outside the mother’s womb). 
 65. I would like to thank Teresa Collett for helping me to understand this 
point.  
 66. DAVIS, supra note 4, at 93. 
 67. See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES ON LATER ABORTIONS 1–2 (2014) 
(detailing the limitations on abortions post-viability).  
 68. Of course, “termination of a pregnancy” here means the early, or 
artificial, termination of a pregnancy. Birth might be said to be the natural 
termination of a pregnancy.  
 69. See BOONIN, supra note 16, at 255 (suggesting that science may 
eventually allow for the removal and survival of a viable fetus through the 
creation of an artificial womb). 
INNOCENT BURDENS 1449 
woman is pregnant as a result of rape, the woman may not have 
an abortion in order to prevent the fetus from using her body if 
the fetus is viable, and hence, there is a way to terminate the 
pregnancy that has the result that the fetus continues to live 
outside the uterus.70 If the fetus is viable, and at least is not 
threatening the life or the health of the pregnant woman, having 
an abortion, of any form, is immoral. 
[W]hile I am arguing for the permissibility of abortion in some 
cases, I am not arguing for the right to secure the death of the 
unborn child. It is easy to confuse these two things in that up 
to a certain point in the life of the foetus it is not able to 
survive outside the mother’s body; hence removing it from her 
body guarantees its death. But they are importantly different. 
I have argued that you are not morally required to spend nine 
months in bed, sustaining the life of that violinist; but to say 
this is by no means to say that if, when you unplug yourself, 
there is a miracle and he survives, you then have a right to 
turn around and slit his throat. You may detach yourself even 
if this costs him his life; you have no right to be guaranteed his 
death, by some other means, if unplugging yourself does not 
kill him. There are some people who will feel dissatisfied by 
this feature of my argument. A woman may be utterly 
devastated by the thought of a child, a bit of herself, put out 
for adoption and never seen or heard of again. She may 
therefore want not merely that the child be detached from her, 
but more, that it die. Some opponents of abortion are inclined 
to regard this as beneath contempt—thereby showing 
insensitivity to what is surely a powerful source of despair. All 
the same, I agree that the desire for the child’s death is not 
one which anybody may gratify, should it turn out to be 
possible to detach the child alive.71 
Thomson does not offer any further argument here for the 
claim that if the fetus is viable, and hence, if it is possible to 
remove the fetus from the pregnant woman’s body without the 
fetus dying as a result, then a pregnant woman may not have an 
abortion, even if the woman is pregnant as a result of rape, at 
least if the fetus is not threatening the life, or the health, of the 
pregnant woman. That is, she does not provide further support 
for rejecting the Permissive Argument. Presumably, her 
argument would be that if you have the options of preventing an 
                                                                                                     
 70. Infra note 72 and accompanying text.  
 71. A Defense of Abortion, supra note 1, at 127. 
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innocent person from using your body by killing the person, or by 
removing the person such that the person dies, or by removing 
the person such that the person lives, then you must choose the 
option in which the innocent person lives. That is, if you have the 
options of killing the violinist, or disconnecting yourself from the 
violinist such that he dies, or of disconnecting yourself from the 
violinist such that he lives, then you must disconnect yourself 
from him such that he lives.  
I will not defend the Permissive Argument here. It is not 
necessary to use the Permissive Argument to defend the Good 
Samaritan Argument from the Kill Versus Let Die Objection or 
the Modified Kill Versus Let Die Objection. It should be noted, 
however, that Thomson’s rejection of the Permissive Argument is 
premised on the assumption that the fetus is a person with the 
same moral rights as you or I.72 This is because the Good 
Samaritan Argument is premised on this assumption.73 In her 
analogy, the unconscious violinist is a person with all of the usual 
moral rights.74 It may be true that, if the fetus is a person and is 
viable and is not a threat to the life or the health of the pregnant 
woman, then a woman who is pregnant as a result of rape may 
not have an abortion. This argument may be irrelevant, however, 
if the fetus is not a person. Even if it is true that the Good 
Samaritan Argument, if sound, fails to establish that a woman 
who is pregnant as a result of rape may have an abortion if the 
fetus is viable, this may be irrelevant to the abortion debate if the 
abortion debate concludes that some or all viable fetuses are not 
persons. Michael Tooley, for example, holds that fetuses are not 
persons and do not have the same rights as you or I.75 Hence, he 
holds that a woman who is pregnant as a result of rape may have 
an abortion even if the fetus is viable.76  
                                                                                                     
 72. See id. at 127 (arguing that a “child” may not be killed should it be 
possible to “detach the child alive”).  
 73. See id. at 113 (assuming for the sake of the argument that the fetus is a 
person).  
 74. See id. at 113 (the violinist is a person).  
 75. See Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 37, 62 
(1971) (claiming that the main factor in determining personhood is when an 
organism has the ability to possess the concept of self as a continuing subject of 
experiences and other mental states).  
 76. See id. at 37 (suggesting that abortions are morally permissible).  
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IV. The Intend to Kill Versus Foresee Death Objection 
In the previous section I argued that the Good Samaritan 
Argument does establish that a pregnant woman may kill the 
fetus in the case of pregnancy as a result of rape, at least when 
the fetus is not viable. It may be objected here that Thomson 
herself would reject this argument. This objection is based on an 
interpretation of Thomson’s claim that you “have no right to be 
guaranteed his [the fetus’s] death.”77 According to this 
interpretation, Thomson is saying here that you may never intend 
to kill the fetus. You may intend only to refuse to allow the fetus 
to use your body by intending to act in a way other than killing 
the fetus, foreseeing that this will lead to the fetus’s death.  
This objection may be put as follows. Intending is a different 
mental state to foreseeing. In particular, intending to kill 
someone is a different mental state to foreseeing the death of 
someone as a result of the act that you intend to perform that is 
not killing. More importantly, intending to kill someone is a 
morally worse mental state than the mental state of foreseeing 
the death of someone as a result of the act that you intend to 
perform that is not killing. The moral bar for intending to kill 
someone is higher than the moral bar for foreseeing the death of 
someone as a result of the act that you intend to perform that is 
not killing. Even if you may intend to act in a way other than to 
kill a person, foreseeing that the person will die as a result, it 
does not follow that you may intend to kill that person. 
Indeed, the moral bar for intending to kill someone could be 
so high that you may never intend to kill someone—or at least, an 
innocent person (as opposed to a guilty person, or a person who is 
a threat (to one’s life or well-being), or a person who is an 
innocent threat, or a person who is innocently shielding a 
threat).78 However, even if this last claim is false, and even if 
there are circumstances in which you may intend to kill an 
innocent person, intending to kill someone is morally worse than 
intending to act in a way other than to kill a person, foreseeing 
that person’s death as a result. Even if you may intend to act in a 
                                                                                                     
 77. A Defense of Abortion, supra note 1, at 127. 
 78. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing additional 
innocent threats and innocent shields to threats). 
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way other than to kill a person, foreseeing that person’s death as 
a result, it does not follow from this that you may intend to kill 
that person. Any argument, therefore, that establishes that you 
may intend to act in a way other than to kill a person, foreseeing 
that person’s death as a result, does not establish thereby that 
you may intend to kill that person. 
With respect to the Good Samaritan Argument, the objection 
is that even if I may intend to refuse to allow the fetus to use my 
body, foreseeing the death of the fetus as a result, I may not 
intend to kill the fetus.79 The most that the argument can 
establish is that in the case of pregnancy as a result of rape, the 
pregnant woman may intend to refuse the fetus the use of her 
body, foreseeing the death of the fetus as a result. It does not 
establish that she may intend to kill the fetus. But abortion is the 
intentional killing of a fetus. In the case of abortion, the pregnant 
woman intends to kill the fetus; she does not merely intend to 
refuse the fetus the use of her body, foreseeing the death of the 
fetus as a result. Hence, the Good Samaritan Argument is 
irrelevant to the abortion debate. Abortion is immoral. 
Consider the following two cases. In the first case, you are a 
patient who checks into a hospital because you are suffering from 
a minor ailment. While you are there the doctor runs tests on you 
and realizes that you are a perfect organ match for five other 
patients, all of whom are dying because their respective organs—
heart, lungs, kidneys, liver, and stomach—are cancerous. The 
doctor approaches you and tells you that you are a perfect organ 
match for five other patients who are dying. She asks you to give 
up your life and donate your organs to the five other patients, 
because otherwise they will die. You refuse, although you foresee 
the death of the five other patients as a result of this refusal. The 
five other patients die.  
In the second case, you are a visitor at the hospital. You are 
aware of a situation identical to the situation described in the 
first case: there is a healthy patient whose is a perfect organ 
match for five other patients, all of whom are dying of cancerous 
                                                                                                     
 79. See BOONIN, supra note 16, at 224–25 (noting that the permissibility of 
choosing to act, foreseeing death, does not entail the permissibility of intending 
death).  
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organs. In the middle of the night, you kill the healthy patient in 
a way that looks as though he died of a natural cause. The next 
day, his organs are transplanted into the five other patients. 
They all live. 
In the first case, you form the intention to refuse to donate 
your organs, foreseeing the death of five people as a result. In the 
second case, you form the intention to kill someone (and foresee 
the saving of five lives as a result). Even if you may intend to 
refuse to donate your organs, foreseeing the death of someone as 
a result, it does not follow that that you may intend to kill 
someone. Intending to kill someone remains immoral, even if it is 
not immoral to refuse to donate your organs, foreseeing the death 
of someone as a result. There is a moral distinction between 
intending to kill someone and intending to act in a way other 
than to kill a person, foreseeing that person’s death as a result. 
The distinction between intending to kill someone and 
intending to act in a way other than to kill a person, foreseeing 
that person’s death as a result, lies behind the Doctrine of Double 
Effect (or the Principle of Double Effect).80 According to this 
doctrine, I may produce a bad effect, provided that I do not intend 
that bad effect, but instead intend to act in a way that is not 
immoral, or that is even morally praiseworthy, foreseeing the 
good, intended effect (which is my end, or a means to my (good) 
end), as well as foreseeing the bad, unintended effect (which is 
neither my end, nor a means to my end), where the good effect is 
sufficiently proportionately good that it compensates for the bad 
effect.81 Acting this way is not immoral.82  
For example, I may give a pregnant woman radiation 
treatment, which is not an immoral act, intending to cure her 
breast cancer, which is a good effect, which is a means to saving 
her life, which is my good end, foreseeing that I will kill the fetus, 
which is a bad effect, which I neither intend as a means to curing 
her breast cancer and saving her life, nor as an end, where saving 
                                                                                                     
 80. See F.J. Connell, Double Effect, Principle of, in 4 NEW CATH. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 1020, 1022 (McGraw-Hill 1967) (describing the Principle of 
Double Effect as a “rule of conduct” that determines when a person may lawfully 
perform an action that results in two effects, one bad and one good).  
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. at 1021 (describing the conditions of morally permissible 
behavior under the Doctrine of Double Effect).  
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the pregnant woman’s life is sufficiently proportionately good 
that it compensates for the death of the fetus.  
It is opposed to, on the one hand, my intending to act in a 
way that is immoral, which obviously is immoral, and may not be 
done.83 For example, I may not intentionally kill a fetus 
(assuming this to be immoral). It is also opposed to, on the other 
hand, my intending to act in a way that is not immoral, or that is 
even morally praiseworthy, foreseeing the good, intended effect 
(which is my end, or a means to my (good) end), as well as 
foreseeing the bad, unintended effect (which is neither my end, 
nor a means to my end), where the good effect is insufficiently 
proportionately good and does not compensate for the bad effect.  
For example, I may not give a pregnant woman a face-lift, 
which is not an immoral act, intending to remove wrinkles from 
the woman’s face, which is a good effect, which is a means to 
making her happier, which is my good end, foreseeing that the 
anesthetic for the surgery will kill the fetus, which is a bad effect, 
which I neither intend as a means to removing her wrinkles and 
making her happier, nor intend as an end, because removing a 
woman’s wrinkles and making her happier is not sufficiently 
proportionately good that it compensates for the death of the 
fetus.84  
The Doctrine of Double Effect is formulated by The New 
Catholic Encyclopedia as follows:  
1. The act itself must be morally good or at least indifferent. 
2. The agent may not positively will the bad effect but may 
permit it. If he could attain the good effect without the bad 
effect he should do so. The bad effect is sometimes said to be 
indirectly voluntary. 
3. The good effect must flow from the action at least as 
immediately (in the order of causality, though not necessarily 
in the order of time) as the bad effect. In other words the good 
effect must be produced directly by the action, not by the bad 
effect. Otherwise the agent would be using a bad means to a 
good end, which is never allowed. 
                                                                                                     
 83. See id. (noting that the act itself must be morally good).  
 84. See id. (directing that the good effect must compensate proportionately 
for the bad effect).  
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4. The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate 
for the allowing of the bad effect.85 
The Doctrine of Double Effect has been used by those who 
reject the Good Samaritan Argument to defend the permissibility 
of performing a life-saving medical procedure on a pregnant 
woman that will result in the death of the fetus: 
On the other hand, suppose a woman is diagnosed with 
uterine cancer, and when operated on is discovered to be 
pregnant. Can the doctor go ahead and remove the woman’s 
uterus, even though the child will again surely die? In the 
latter case, the initial act is removal of the uterus, an act not 
wrong in itself: its effects are the saving of the life of the 
mother, and the death of the child. The application of PDE 
[Principle of Double Effect] suggests there is indeed a 
proportionality between the two—life as against life. Crucially, 
there is no intention to kill the child, only to save the mother: 
the child’s death is not a means to the saving of the mother, 
otherwise it would be a case of killing one innocent person to 
save another.86  
It is important to point out that the argument about the 
moral distinction between intending to kill someone and 
intending to act in a way other than to kill a person while 
foreseeing that person’s death as a result does not actually 
require the death of anyone. In the two hospital cases outlined 
above, it might happen that you merely form your intention (to 
refuse to donate your organs, in the first case, and to kill the 
healthy patient, in the second case), and that a miracle occurs (all 
five patients recover instantly) and that you never act on your 
intention. This would not affect the argument that it is morally 
worse to intend to kill someone than to intend to act in a way 
other than to kill a person, foreseeing that person’s death as a 
result.  
It is also important to point out that the argument about the 
moral distinction between intending to kill someone, and 
intending to act in a way other than to kill a person, foreseeing 
that person’s death as a result, makes no mention of motive.87 A 
                                                                                                     
 85. Id.  
 86. ODERBURG, supra note 61, at 29. 
 87. See BOONIN, supra note 16, at 212 (describing the distinction as the 
intention of causing a death versus the foresight that a death will occur, making 
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motive is the reason why a person forms the intention to act that 
she forms, and not the intention to act itself.88 A person may have 
any reason for forming the intention to kill someone. She may 
want to save five innocent lives, for example. Or she may want to 
carry out the court’s sentence of death. Or she may want to get 
revenge for someone’s murdering a member of her family. A 
person may also have any reason for forming the intention to 
refuse to donate her organs, foreseeing the death of five people as 
a result. She may want to continue to live, for example. Or she 
may want to annoy her parents, who are strict utilitarians. Or 
she may want to put pressure on the government to provide 
better preventative care for people in hospitals.  
According to the objection based on this distinction, although 
you may intend to disconnect yourself from the violinist, 
foreseeing his death as a result, you may not intend to kill the 
violinist by slitting his throat. Even if the kidnapped, unconscious 
violinist has no right to use your body for nine months without 
your permission, you may not intend to kill him. 
According to this objection, the most that the Good 
Samaritan Argument can establish is that, in the case of a 
woman who is pregnant as a result of rape and who intends to 
refuse to allow the pre-viable fetus to use her body, she may 
intend to have a form of abortion that does not involve the 
intention to kill the fetus. She may intend to have, for example, a 
hysterotomy abortion, or a hysterectomy abortion. These 
abortions involve the intention only to remove the fetus from the 
body of the pregnant woman, foreseeing that this will lead to the 
death of the fetus. This is permissible, at least if the Good 
Samaritan Argument is sound. The Good Samaritan Argument, 
however, cannot establish that a woman who is pregnant as a 
result of rape may have a form of abortion that involves the 
intention to kill the fetus. She may not have a craniotomy 
abortion, for example. This is because a craniotomy abortion 
involves intending to kill the fetus.89 Because the vast majority of 
                                                                                                     
no mention as to the reasons why one chooses one act over the other). 
 88. See James Edwin Mahon, Doing the Wrong Thing for a Good Reason, in 
THE GOOD WIFE AND PHILOSOPHY 89–99 (Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray & Robert Arp 
eds., 2013) (explaining the difference between motive and intention).  
 89. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing a craniotomy 
abortion). 
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abortions are forms of abortion that involve the intention to kill 
the fetus,90 it follows that even if the Good Samaritan Argument 
is sound, it is irrelevant to the abortion debate, at least when one 
is talking about the much more common, and safer, forms of 
abortion, which involve the intention to kill the fetus, and not the 
rarer, and more dangerous, forms of abortion, which do not 
involve the intention to kill the fetus,91 although they do involve 
the intention to act in a way other than killing the fetus, 
foreseeing the death of the fetus as a result. The vast majority of 
abortions remain immoral. 
This objection, which may be called the “Intend to Kill 
Versus Foresee Death Objection,” might appear to be endorsed by 
Thomson herself against her own Good Samaritan Argument. 
Thomson has argued elsewhere that a surgeon “may not even 
choose to cut up one where five will thereby be saved,” where this 
involves forming the intention to kill one person.92 This implies 
that she holds that you may not form the intention to kill an 
innocent person, even to save another innocent person. She has 
also argued that, in the case of a bystander who sees that a 
runaway trolley is heading towards five innocent people standing 
on its track, who knows that there is one innocent person 
standing on a side track, and who knows that if he throws a 
switch he can divert the trolley, saving the five people, foreseeing 
the death of the person on the side track as a result, “I should 
think you may turn it all the same.”93 This implies that she holds 
that you may form the intention to divert a trolley, foreseeing 
that this will lead to an innocent person’s death, in order to save 
an innocent person. Her conclusions about these two cases, 
therefore, imply that she holds that you may form the intention 
to act in a way other than to kill a person, foreseeing that 
                                                                                                     
 90. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (noting that “most common, 
and safer, forms of abortion involve the killing of the fetus”). 
 91. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (describing more 
invasive abortion procedures that do not involve directly killing the fetus prior 
to removal from the woman’s body that are more dangerous and thus rarely 
used). 
 92. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 
59 MONIST 204, 206 (1976). 
 93. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1395, 1397 
(1985). 
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person’s death as a result, in order to save another innocent 
person, but that you may not form the intention to kill someone, 
in order to save another innocent person.94  
However, there is support for the contrary claim that 
Thomson would not endorse this objection to her own Good 
Samaritan Argument. In her later article, Rights and Deaths,95 
Thomson considers this moral distinction directly: “We need to 
know why it should matter so crucially whether the death a man 
foresees is, on the one hand, his end or means, or on the other 
hand, a merely foreseen consequence.”96 Here she argues that 
there is no morally significant difference between intending to 
kill someone and intending to act in a way other than to kill a 
person, foreseeing that person’s death as a result.97 
Thomson considers two cases. In the first case, an aggressor 
nation has threatened us with death unless we agree to be 
enslaved by them. They will use a monster missile launcher to 
kill us if we do not submit to them. They were able to build only 
one missile launcher, however. The missile launcher has small 
tunnels, and only very young children—“two-year olds, in 
fact”98—can fit in the tunnels and operate the missile launcher. 
(Thomson does not explain this detail further, but it can be 
stipulated that the children have been trained to crawl through 
the tunnels and push colored knobs at the end of the tunnels; 
they remain innocent of wrongdoing). Unfortunately, the children 
also live in the missile launcher. “We are capable of bombing the 
site. Unfortunately, if we bomb to destroy the launcher to save 
our lives, we kill the children.”99  
In the second case, everything is the same except that the 
aggressor nation has many, many missile launchers. However, 
they have only one team of trained two-year olds. “We are capable 
                                                                                                     
 94. Note that Thomson appears to have abandoned the position that you 
may form the intention to divert a trolley, foreseeing that this will lead to an 
innocent person’s death, in order to save five innocent people. See generally 
Thomson, supra note 42). 
 95. Thomson, supra note 37. 
 96. Id. at 152.  
 97. See id. (noting that a man “who kills only indirectly” still foresees the 
outcome, death, and yet chooses to act anyway).  
 98. Id. at 153. 
 99. Id.  
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of bombing the site. Unfortunately, bombing the site will save our 
lives only if by bombing we kill the children.”100 
About the first case she says “we only indirectly kill the 
children: their deaths are not our end, nor do we need their 
deaths if we are to achieve our end—our end would be just as well 
achieved if by some miracle the children survive the bombing.”101 
About the second case she says: “we directly kill the children: 
their deaths are necessary to the achieving of our end, and if, by a 
miracle, they survive the bombing, we must bomb again.”102 That 
is, if the children survive the destruction of the missile launcher, 
they will have to be bombed. About these two cases she says:  
Of course some very high-minded people may say we must not 
bomb in either case: after all, the children are innocent! 
Lower-minded people, like me, will say we can bomb in either 
case . . . . To accept this is also to grant that the difference 
between direct and indirect killing does not have the moral 
significance which has been claimed for it. The acts in both . . . 
are both permitted, though one is a direct, the other an 
indirect killing.103 
Thomson’s argument here implies that she would reject the 
Intend to Kill Versus Foresee Death Objection to her own Good 
Samaritan Argument. This is because she argues that either 
there is no moral significant difference between intending to kill 
someone and intending to act in a way other than to kill a person, 
foreseeing that person’s death as a result, or there is no profound 
moral difference between the two. That is, she holds that one may 
do either, if one may do one of the two. In particular, one may 
intend to kill someone, if one may intend to act in a way other 
than to kill a person, foreseeing that person’s death as a result.104 
This response may be called the “Moral Equivalence of Intend to 
Kill Versus Foresee Death Response” (or, if it is preferred, the 
“Sufficient Moral Equivalence of Intend to Kill Versus Foresee 
Death Response”).  
                                                                                                     
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 153–54. 
 102. Id. at 154. 
 103. Id. at 154–55.  
 104. See id. at 157 (claiming that Finnis, in his response to Thomson’s A 
Defense of Abortion, failed to prove that there is a morally significant difference 
between killing and letting die).  
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It seems that Thomson, therefore, would reject the Intend to 
Kill Versus Foresee Death Objection to her own Good Samaritan 
Argument. It seems that she would provide the Moral 
Equivalence of Intend to Kill Versus Foresee Death Response (or, 
if it is preferred, the Sufficient Moral Equivalence of Intend to 
Kill Versus Foresee Death Response). 
Although Thomson’s response to the Intend to Kill Versus 
Foresee Death Objection remains a defensible response, it may be 
argued that the Moral Equivalence of Intend to Kill Versus 
Foresee Death Response (or, if it is preferred, the Sufficient 
Moral Equivalence of Intend to Kill Versus Foresee Death 
Response), fails.105 Even if this is the case, however, it does not 
matter because an alternative response is available. Once again, 
this response is not made by Thomson, although it is inspired by 
her. The alternative response I have in mind is as follows. Let it 
be granted for the sake of the argument that there is a morally 
significant difference between intending to kill someone and 
intending to act in a way other than to kill a person, foreseeing 
that person’s death as a result. Nevertheless, the Good 
Samaritan Argument does establish that a pregnant woman may 
form an intention to kill the fetus.  
There are two arguments that can be made in favor of this 
response, just as there were two arguments that could be made in 
favor of the response to the Kill Versus Let Die Objection. Indeed, 
the two arguments are similar in all respects. They may even be 
called the “Exclusive Argument (Against the Intend to Kill 
Versus Foresee Death Objection)” and the “Inclusive Argument 
(Against the Intend to Kill Versus Foresee Death Objection).”  
The Exclusive Argument against the Intend to Kill Versus 
Foresee Death Objection is as follows. Let it be granted that the 
Good Samaritan Argument establishes that in the case of 
pregnancy as a result of rape, the pregnant woman may intend to 
refuse to allow the fetus to use her body, foreseeing that this will 
lead to the death of the fetus.106 If, however, the only way for the 
                                                                                                     
 105. See BOONIN, supra note 16, at 213 (noting that most critics of abortion 
accept that there is in fact a moral distinction between intending and merely 
foreseeing death). 
 106. See A Defense of Abortion, supra note 1, at 123 (suggesting that a 
woman who is pregnant due to rape is not obligated to allow the fetus to use her 
body for life support). 
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pregnant woman to intend this refusal, that is, to intend to 
prevent the fetus from using her body, is to intend to kill the 
fetus—if the only options are to intend to allow the fetus to use 
her body, or to intend to kill the fetus—then she may intend to 
kill the fetus. Hence, the Good Samaritan Argument does 
establish that a pregnant woman may intend to kill the fetus. 
The more general argument that lies behind the Exclusive 
Argument is that, because no one has the right to use your body 
without your permission, if the only way to intend to prevent a 
person from using your body is to intend to kill that person, then 
you may intend to kill that person.107 Even if it were true that, if 
you have the options of intending to prevent a person from using 
your body by intending to act in a way other than to kill that 
person, foreseeing that that person will die as a result, or 
intending to kill that person, you must intend to act in a way 
other than to kill that person, foreseeing that person’s death as a 
result, it would still be true that, if you have only the option of 
intending to prevent a person from using your body by intending 
to kill that person, then you may intend to kill that person.  
The Exclusive Argument in defense of the Good Samaritan 
Argument against the Intend to Kill Versus Foresee Death 
Objection is that, if intending to disconnect yourself from the 
violinist is not an option, and the only options are to intend to 
remain hooked up to the violinist for nine months, or to intend to 
slit his throat and kill him, then you may intend to slit his throat 
and kill him. Even if the unconscious violinist has been 
kidnapped and does not intend to use your body for nine months, 
he has no right to use your body for nine months without your 
permission, and if the only way to intend to prevent him from 
doing this is to intend to kill him, then you may intend to kill 
him. 
According to the Exclusive Argument, if a woman who is 
pregnant as a result of rape and who intends to prevent the fetus 
from using her body only has the option of having a craniotomy 
abortion, which involves intending to kill the fetus,108 then she 
                                                                                                     
 107. Id. at 117–18 (discussing further the idea that the fetus in this case 
that has no right to use a woman’s body). 
 108. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing the craniotomy 
abortion). 
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may have a craniotomy abortion. It follows that the Good 
Samaritan Argument establishes that having a craniotomy 
abortion is permissible, and may be performed. 
As it was pointed out above, however, it is not the case that a 
woman who is pregnant as a result of rape and who intends to 
prevent the fetus from using her body has only the option of 
intending to kill the fetus. A pregnant woman has the option of 
intending to prevent the fetus from using her body by, for 
example, intending to remove the fetus from the uterus, 
foreseeing that the fetus will die as a result (a hysterotomy 
abortion), or intending to remove the uterus containing the fetus 
from her body, foreseeing that the fetus will die as a result (a 
hysterectomy abortion).109 If the Exclusive Argument is the only 
way to defend the Good Samaritan Argument from the Intend to 
Kill Versus Foresee Death Objection, then this argument cannot 
establish that a woman may intend to kill the fetus. The most 
that the Good Samaritan Argument can establish is that in the 
case of pregnancy as a result of rape, the pregnant woman may 
intend to prevent the fetus from using her body by intending a 
form of abortion that does not involve killing the fetus. Because 
the vast majority of abortions are forms of abortion that involve 
killing the fetus,110 it follows that Thomson’s argument is 
irrelevant to the abortion debate, at least when one is talking 
about the more common, and safer, forms of abortion, which 
involve killing the fetus, and not the rarer, and more dangerous, 
forms of abortion, which do not involve killing the fetus, although 
they do involve the death of the fetus.111 Hence, the vast majority 
of abortions are immoral. 
Once again, it is possible to defend the Exclusive Argument 
by adapting the argument. Because there are a number of other 
morally relevant factors to be taken into account when 
considering different forms of abortion, such as the threat to the 
pregnant woman’s life or health, as well as the risk, or the 
certainty, of her being unable to become pregnant again, these 
                                                                                                     
 109. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing hysterotomy and 
hysterectomy abortions). 
 110. Supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text (discussing generally the 
safer, more common forms of abortion in comparison with the rarer, more 
dangerous forms). 
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morally relevant factors can be invoked to defend the choice of a 
safer form of abortion over a more dangerous form of abortion, 
and the choice of a form of abortion that does not jeopardize, or 
prevent, the woman from becoming pregnant again, over a form 
of abortion that does. It can be argued that the only safe way, or 
the safest way, or the best way (with respect to future 
pregnancies) for a woman to prevent the fetus from using her 
body in the case of pregnancy as a result of rape is to have an 
abortion that involves killing the fetus.112 Because she may 
choose the safer, or the safest, or best form of abortion available, 
she may intend to kill the fetus. The Good Samaritan Argument 
would therefore remain relevant to the abortion debate, and the 
most common, and safer, forms of abortion would not be immoral. 
Once again, however, it is not necessary to defend the 
Exclusive Argument by adapting the argument. This is because 
the Inclusive Argument (Against the Intend to Kill Versus 
Foresee Death Objection) can be made in defense of the Good 
Samaritan Argument. Let it be granted that the Good Samaritan 
Argument establishes that in the case of pregnancy as a result of 
rape, the pregnant woman may intend to refuse to allow the fetus 
to use her body.113 If one way for the pregnant woman to intend to 
this refusal—that is, to intend to prevent the fetus from using her 
body—is to intend to kill the fetus, and if all other ways for the 
pregnant woman to intend to this refusal do not involve intending 
to kill the fetus, but do involve intending to act in a way other 
than to kill a person, foreseeing that person’s death as a result, 
then the pregnant woman may intend to kill the fetus, 
nevertheless. If, for example, a woman who is pregnant as a 
result of rape and who intends to prevent the fetus from using 
her body has the options of having a hysterotomy abortion, or a 
hysterectomy abortion, or a craniotomy abortion, then she may 
have a craniotomy abortion. It follows that the Good Samaritan 
Argument, if sound, establishes that having a craniotomy 
abortion is permissible and may be intended. 
                                                                                                     
 112. See BOONIN, supra note 16, at 193 n.43 (discussing the lower mortality 
rates associated with those forms of abortion characterized as “killing”). 
 113. See A Defense of Abortion, supra note 1, at 121 (implying that a woman 
may justly refuse to support the fetus in the case of a pregnancy due to rape).  
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The more general argument that lies behind the Inclusive 
Argument is that, because no one has the right to use your body 
without your permission, if you intend to prevent a person from 
using your body, and you have the options of intending to act in a 
way other than to kill a person, foreseeing that person’s death as 
a result, and intending to kill that person, then you may intend to 
kill that person. This is because, in the case of certain 
circumstances that are sufficiently morally serious, both a 
morally worse intention and a morally better intention may be 
formed. Even if one intention remains morally worse and the 
other intention remains morally better, it is not the case that in 
such morally serious circumstances you may not form the morally 
worse intention. You may. 
According to the Inclusive Argument, if intending to kill the 
violinist by slitting his throat is one option, and intending to 
disconnect yourself from the violinist, foreseeing that he will die 
as a result, is another option, and these are the only two options 
for freeing yourself from the violinist, then you may intend to slit 
the violinist’s throat, rather than intend to disconnect yourself 
from him, foreseeing that he will die as a result. Even if the 
unconscious violinist has been kidnapped and does not intend to 
use your body for nine months, he has no right to use your body 
for nine months without your permission, and if one of the only 
two intentions that if acted upon will free yourself from him is 
the intention to kill him, then you may intend to kill him. 
The Inclusive Argument does not require the rejection of the 
idea that there is a profound moral difference between intending 
to kill someone and intending to act in a way other than to kill a 
person, foreseeing that person’s death as a result. It simply 
requires acceptance of the idea that both intending to kill 
someone and intending to act in a way other than to kill a person, 
foreseeing that person’s death as a result, are options in the 
situation in which another person is using your body without 
your permission, and there are no other options for preventing 
this person from using your body. They are both options because 
the circumstances in which another person is using your body 
without your permission are sufficiently morally serious.  
The Inclusive Argument is able to defend the Good 
Samaritan Argument from the Intend to Kill Versus Foresee 
Death Objection. It follows that if the Good Samaritan Argument 
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is sound, it establishes what it needs to establish in order to 
prove that abortion of any form is permissible when the woman is 
pregnant as a result of rape and the fetus is not viable. 
It should be noted that there is a third argument that may be 
used to defend the Good Samaritan Argument from the Intend to 
Kill Versus Foresee Death Objection, just as there was a third 
argument that could be used to defend it from the Modified Kill 
Versus Let Die Objection.114 Indeed, this third argument is 
similar in all respects. It may even be called the “Permissive 
Argument (Against the Intend to Kill Versus Foresee Death 
Objection).” This is the argument that a woman who is pregnant 
as a result of rape and who intends to prevent the fetus from 
using her body without her permission may intend to kill the 
fetus even if there are other ways of intending to prevent the 
fetus from using her body that do not result in the death of the 
fetus. That is, if, in addition to abortions that involve intending to 
kill the fetus, and abortions that involve intending to act in a way 
other than killing the fetus, foreseeing the death of the fetus, 
there is a non-abortion option that involves intending to act in a 
way other than killing the fetus, and the fetus continuing to live 
without using the pregnant woman’s body, then the pregnant 
woman may still choose an abortion that involves intending to 
kill the fetus.  
Thomson would also reject this argument, just as she 
rejected the Permissive Argument against the Kill Versus Lie Die 
Objection. She would argue—at least if the fetus is not 
threatening the life, or the health, of the pregnant woman—that 
even if the woman is pregnant as a result of rape, the woman 
may not have an abortion in order to prevent the fetus from using 
her body if there is a non-abortion option that involves intending 
to act in a way other than killing the fetus, and the fetus 
continuing to live without using the pregnant woman’s body.115 If 
the fetus is viable, and at least not threatening the life, or the 
health, of the pregnant woman, then having an abortion, of any 
form, is immoral.  
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not an option “should it turn out to be possible to detach the child alive”).  
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Presumably, again, her argument would be that if you have 
the options of intending to prevent an innocent person from using 
your body without your permission by intending to kill the 
person, or by intending to remove the person, foreseeing that 
person’s death as a result, or by intending to remove the person, 
foreseeing that the person lives, then you must choose the option 
in which you free yourself from the innocent person and the 
innocent person lives.116 That is, if you have the options of 
intending to kill the violinist, or intending to disconnect yourself 
from the violinist, foreseeing his death as a result, or of intending 
to disconnect yourself from the violinist, foreseeing that he lives, 
then you must intend to disconnect yourself from him such that 
he lives.  
I will not defend the Permissive Argument against the 
Intend to Kill Versus Foresee Death Objection here. It is not 
necessary to use the Permissive Argument to defend the Good 
Samaritan Argument from the Intend to Kill Versus Foresee 
Death Objection. However, it should be noted, again, that 
Thomson’s rejection of this Permissive Argument is premised on 
the assumption that the fetus is a person with the same moral 
rights as you or I.117 Even if it is true that the Good Samaritan 
Argument, if sound, fails to establish that a woman who is 
pregnant as a result of rape may have an abortion if the fetus is 
viable, this may be irrelevant to the abortion debate if the 
abortion debate concludes that some or all viable fetuses are not 
persons.118 
V. Conclusion 
My aim in this Article is a limited one. It is to defend 
Thomson’s Good Samaritan Argument from two important 
objections that hold that, even if her argument is sound, it fails to 
                                                                                                     
 116. See id. at 118–19 (suggesting that, in the most basic sense, “all persons 
have a right to life”). 
 117. See id. at 110 (assuming for the sake of the argument that the fetus is a 
person). 
 118. See Tooley, supra note 76, at 41 (criticizing the interchangeable use of 
“person” and “human being” given the particular characteristics and privileges, 
such as the right to life, that personhood entails).  
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establish that abortion is permissible. If I am right, then, if her 
argument is sound, it establishes that abortion is permissible, at 
least in the case of woman who is pregnant as a result of rape 
with a non-viable fetus. Because many people believe that her 
argument is sound, it follows that they should agree that her 
argument establishes that abortion, in this case at least,119 is 
permissible. 
It should be noted, however, that some people believe that 
the Good Samaritan Argument is not sound. Indeed, philosophers 
from entirely different backgrounds have rejected the argument. 
Peter Singer, for example, rejects the Good Samaritan Argument: 
[A] utilitarian . . . would reject Thomson’s judgment in the case 
of the violinist. The utilitarian would hold that, however 
outraged I may be at having been kidnapped, if the 
consequences of disconnecting myself from the violinist are, on 
balance and taking into account the interests of everyone 
affected, worse than the consequences of remaining connected, 
I ought to remain connected. . . . In rejecting Thomson’s . . . 
judgment in the case of the violinist, the utilitarian would also 
be rejecting her argument for abortion. Thomson claimed that 
her argument justified abortion even if we allowed the life of 
the fetus to count as heavily as the life of a normal person. The 
utilitarian would say that it would be wrong to refuse to 
sustain a person’s life for nine months if that was the only way 
the person could survive. Therefore, if the life of the fetus is 
given the same weight as the life of a normal person, the 
utilitarian would say that it would be wrong to refuse to carry 
the fetus until it can survive outside the womb.120 
Singer himself believes that no fetuses are persons, and hence, 
that the unsoundness of Thomson’s argument is irrelevant to the 
abortion debate.121 Nevertheless, his consequences-based 
                                                                                                     
 119. Thomson extends her argument to all cases of unwanted pregnancy 
where the fetus is non-viable, arguing that they are permissible, although she 
does make further distinctions between “decent” and “indecent” permissible 
abortions. See A Defense of Abortion, supra note 1, at 127 (noting that “[i]t would 
be indecent in the woman to request an abortion, and indecent in a doctor to 
perform it, if she is in her seventh month, and wants the abortion just to avoid 
the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad”). For the best analysis of her complete 
argument, see generally BOONIN, supra note 16. 
 120. SINGER, supra note 18, at 133–34. 
 121. See id. at 136 (“Because no fetus is a person, no fetus has the same 
claim to life as a person.”).  
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argument that the Good Samaritan Argument is unsound must be 
answered.  
David Oderberg also rejects the Good Samaritan Argument: 
It is wrong to kill someone in order to escape physical 
inconvenience, whether that inconvenience lasts for a day or for 
nine months. . . . In the violinist case the good effect is your being 
released from nine months’ inconvenience, and the bad effect is 
the death of the violinist. Is there a proportionality here? 
Evidently not. Hence you are not permitted to disconnect the 
tube, unpleasant though the prospect of your confinement may 
be—and this is really just an explanation of why your self-
defensive acts must always be proportionate; in other words, the 
bad effects of your acts must always be proportionate to the good 
you are seeking to defend. . . . Consideration of her argument has 
led to the position that abortion is not justifiable even in the cases 
of rape (or, by parity of reasoning, incest)122 
Oderberg believes that it is never permissible to intentionally kill 
another human being, regardless of the good consequences of doing 
so. It is never permissible to intentionally kill another human being 
even to save your own life. However, by availing of the Doctrine of 
Double Effect, he argues that you may “knowingly but 
unintentionally”123 cause the death of another person when the 
other person is (intentionally or unintentionally) threatening one’s 
life: “the right of self-defence is precisely what it says, a right of 
defence, not a right of intentional homicide.”124 Hence he argues 
that if it were possible—however implausible it may seem—in the 
case of an abortion to knowingly but unintentionally cause the death 
of the fetus, then the abortion would be permissible in order to save 
the life of the woman: “Can we imagine the doctor in the craniotomy 
case thinking, ‘I am crushing the child’s skull but I am not killing 
him, though he will in fact die?’ Does this ring true? It might.”125  
However, even if such a knowing-but-unintentional-killing 
abortion would be permissible, it would be permissible only to save 
the life of the woman, since the good effect of saving the woman’s life 
is sufficiently proportionately good that it compensates for the bad 
effect of the death of the fetus. In the case of a non-life-threatening 
                                                                                                     
 122. ODERBERG, supra note 61, at 26. 
 123. Id. at 28. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 30. 
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pregnancy that is the result of rape, where the good effect of the 
abortion is relieving the woman of the burden of pregnancy, and the 
bad effect of the abortion is the death of the fetus, even a knowing-
but-unintentional-killing abortion would be immoral, since relieving 
the woman of the burden of pregnancy is not sufficiently 
proportionately good to compensate for the bad effect of the death of 
the fetus. His Doctrine of Double Effect-based argument that the 
Good Samaritan Argument is unsound must also be answered. 
Thomson herself has said about her argument: 
So this is an issue of great importance to women. Denial of the 
abortion right severely constrains their liberty, and among the 
consequences of that constraint are impediments to their 
achievement of equality. . . . But if abortion were murder, all that 
would amount to little. . . . If killing the fetus were murder, the 
woman would have to carry it to term, despite the burden on her 
of doing so. Morality, after all, does not permit us to commit 
murder in the name of avoiding such burdens.126 
The Good Samaritan Argument for the conclusion that it is 
permissible to kill an innocent person—that the killing of an 
innocent person is not murder in the case of pregnancy as a result of 
rape—is all the more relevant given the difficulty of resolving the 
debate over the personhood of the fetus127 and the continued 
insistence on the part of some on the anti-abortion side that abortion 
in the case of pregnancy as a result of rape is murder.128 It would be 
good to devote more, or at least equal, time and energy to the Good 
Samaritan Argument. 
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